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From the sea... to outer space: the command of space as the 
foundation of spacepower theory 
Bleddyn E. Bowen 
Department of Defence Studies, King’s College London 
bleddyn.bowen@kcl.ac.uk 
Abstract 
Colin Gray once lamented the absence of a ‘Mahan for the final frontier’ and spacepower theory in 
strategic studies. This article proposes the command of space as the fundamental concept of 
spacepower theory, and that Mahan himself has much to offer in the endeavour of spacepower theory-
making than has hitherto been realised. The theory is advanced by tempering versions of the 
‘command of space,’ stressing its educational intent, and explaining the nuanced sub-concepts of 
space control and denial through understanding some precedents set by seapower theory. In the 
process, aspects of Mahanian and Corbettian seapower theory are unified. 
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Introduction 
‘[Some] naval officers… have admitted to me that the reason they joined the Navy was because Starfleet 
Command wasn’t hiring.’ – Chris Weuve1 
 In the quarter of a century since the Global Positioning System (GPS) guided the U.S. VII 
Corps through the featureless Iraqi desert to smash Saddam Hussein’s forces in the first Gulf War, 
satellite networks have become ever more integral to military, economic, and political power. 
Spacepower – the use of outer space for political ends – is proliferating horizontally and vertically.2 
States rely on over 1,300 satellites to enable precision warfare as well as precision agriculture.
3
 In 
addition to the proliferation of spacepower within states and economies, Earth’s major space powers 
are developing their space warfare capabilities.
4
 Yet more than 25 years after the ‘First Space War,’ 
spacepower theory is still a small subfield in strategic studies.
5
 No theoretical framework to aid 
discussion and education about space activities or even to explain what ‘it is all about’ exists.6 The 
previous commander of US Air Force Space Command and now commander of US Strategic 
Command, General John Hyten, has emphasised the need for further education in space warfare 
operations among his ranks.
7
 However, the ‘Space Mission Force’ initiative does not appear to engage 
with the higher strategic levels of thought about spacepower and space warfare. A strategic education 
in the meaning of spacepower is sorely needed, and can be provided by spacepower theory. In 1996, 
Colin Gray pleaded for an Alfred Thayer Mahan for the final frontier, yet this call went largely 
                                                     
1
 Michael Peck, ‘Aircraft carriers in space,’ Interview with Chris Weuve, Foreign Policy, 28/09/2012, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/28/aircraft-carriers-in-space/ (accessed 09/09/2016) 
2
 See: Robert C. Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) 
3
 For an overview of satellite uses, see: U.K. Ministry of Defence (MoD), The UK Military Space Primer 
(Shrivenham: Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, 2010); Air Command and Staff College Space 
Research Electives Seminars, AU-18 Space Primer (Montgomery: Air University Press, 2009) 
4
 On an overview of antisatellite testing, see: Brian Weeden, ‘Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, And 
Russian Anti-satellite Testing in Space,’ (Washington, D.C.: Secure World Foundation, 2014) 
5
 The term ’First Space War’ first appeared in: Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, ‘The First Space War: The 
Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War’, RUSI Journal 136:4 (1991) 45 
6
 Colin S. Gray, ‘The Influence of Space Power Upon History’, Comparative Strategy, 15:4(1996) 304 
7
 John E. Hyten, ‘Space Mission Force: Developing Space Warfighters for Tomorrow’, US Air Force, 
29/06/2016. 
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unanswered: there has only been a piecemeal effort to create spacepower theory in the strategic 
studies community.
8
  
This article attempts to fill that lacuna. It argues that the ‘command of space’ is the 
fundamental concept to strategise about space warfare and theorise further on the role of spacepower 
on a grand strategic level. Some of the classical works of strategic theory have far greater applicability 
to the new environment than has hitherto been appreciated. Like the command of the sea, the 
command of space signifies the degree to which one party can use a medium for itself and/or deny it 
to another. It therefore applies and adapts aspects of traditional sea power theory to form the basis of a 
new framework for understanding and interpreting space warfare. This article is primarily concerned 
with triggering and encouraging constructive strategic thought about outer space by developing the 
founding concept of strategic theory – the command of space. This article is not an in-depth analysis 
of the entirety of seapower theory and its applicability to outer space.
9
 The first section of the article 
clarifies key terms for spacepower theory in strategic studies. Then, it describes the educational intent 
of spacepower theory before articulating the headline concept of the command of space in its basic 
form, with its two sub-concepts of space control and space denial. As the primary contribution of this 
research is to advance spacepower theory, the command of space is described on its own terms before 
exploring its analogical origins in seapower theory. The similarities of Mahan and Corbett’s seapower 
theories are explained to add nuance to the meaning of commanding space. Thereafter, the 
commonalities between Mahan and Corbett’s seapower are further elaborated to theorise other aspects 
of spacepower: the permeability of command; the unity of theory in sea and space communications; 
the contingent decisiveness of commanding space for war on Earth; and the contingent decisiveness 
of battle in space. 
                                                     
8
 Gray, ‘The Influence,’ 307 
9
 For a survey of seapower and airpower analogies to outer space, see: John B. Sheldon, Reasoning by Strategic 
Analogy: Classical Strategic Thought and the Foundations of a Theory of Space Power, PhD Thesis, University 
of Reading, 2005. 
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The trouble with terminology 
Whilst there have been valuable contributions in a collective effort of spacepower theory-
making since 1991, they do not propose a comprehensive theoretical structure that can be applied 
across a range of time periods and scenarios to improve judgment and critical analysis.
10
 This is partly 
because there is little discussion and consistency in the small spacepower literature as to what key 
terms such as ‘strategy,’ ‘strategic theory,’ and ‘spacepower theory’ mean. Gray conceived strategy as 
merely the ‘use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.’11 Strategy’s 
holistic nature has meant that it has been employed in problematic terms by some authors in the 
spacepower literature, and conflated with strategic theory.  
Strategic theory is a summation of ideas, concepts, and propositions that should assist an 
individual’s development and practice of strategy, but not a ready-to-use strategy. Strategic theory 
achieves this by promoting self-education and the critical application of propositions or ideas to 
scenarios to develop independent and creative strategic thought that enable one to develop practical 
solutions or insights to a problem at hand.
12
 This is what Gray means by theory fuelling understanding 
for practical benefit.
13
 Spacepower theory, then, should embrace, explain, and connect the many 
different uses of spacepower in the service of space strategies, and should view strategic theory as 
geared towards helping practice.
14
 Spacepower theory achieves this through the concept of the 
command of space, which connects any acts of space warfare to grand strategic thinking and the 
myriad contributions of spacepower to an overall war effort. Strategic theory, of which spacepower 
theory is a type and specification, can help students and analysts of war make sense of spacepower 
                                                     
10
 For example:  Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (Abingdon: Frank 
Cass, 2002); Michael V. Smith, Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower (Montgomery, A.L.: Air University 
Press, 2002); John J. Klein, Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles, and Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); John 
B. Sheldon and Colin S. Gray, ‘Theory Ascendant? Spacepower and the Challenge of Strategic Theory’, in: 
Charles D. Lutes et al., ed., Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays (Washington, D.C.: National 
Defense University Press, 2011). Note that the digital version of this edited volume does not contain pagination 
11
 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 17 
12
 Jon Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan 
Reconsidered (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997) xv-xviii, 6-7, 44, 67, 69 
13
 Colin S. Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect (Montgomery, A.L.: Air University Press, 2012) 10 
14
 Sheldon and Gray, ‘Theory Ascendant?’ 
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with existing concepts from terrestrial experience whilst encouraging creative strategic thought and 
sound judgment.  
The spacepower literature can be imprecise when using central terms such as ‘space strategy’ 
and ‘spacepower theory.’ John Klein’s terminological ambiguity detracts somewhat from his useful 
analogising of Corbett’s theory to outer space.15 This terminological imprecision is a problematic 
basis for grappling with the differences between an applied strategy and course of action for a 
particular scenario in a place and time (a space strategy) and an abstract universal strategic theory that 
provides concepts to help devise a strategy through education (spacepower theory). Klein’s welcome 
contribution to spacepower theory is assailed by a lack of clarity over whether he intended to develop 
a plan for the United States in space, or a treatise to help people make plans for the United States in 
space. Using Gray’s definition of strategy above, a space strategy is a plan to use force and the threat 
of it with regard to outer space and the use of spacepower on Earth. Klein’s Space Warfare reads on 
occasion as a space strategy for the United States, but at other times as an abstracted spacepower 
theory. The fluid switching between a space strategy and spacepower theory in Klein’s work makes it 
difficult for the reader to discern a universal principle or theoretical truth from a specific plan of 
action for US space policy or strategy.
16
 
This confusion is partly caused by a similar problem with terms like ‘maritime strategy’ and 
‘seapower theory.’ Klein’s ideas on spacepower and space warfare are derived from Julian Corbett’s 
Principles of Maritime Strategy, and show the origin of the ambiguities in the language between 
spacepower theory and space strategy. Corbett’s work is in effect a seapower theory that is meant to 
help planners and strategists develop a maritime strategy for whatever contingencies they face. The 
principles underlying any maritime strategy are in effect seapower theory, though Corbett himself 
does not use such terms in his definitions of maritime strategy and its relation to seapower, with 
                                                     
15
 Klein, Space Warfare, 3-7, 13, 35 
16
 For example: Klein, Space Warfare, 6-15, 20-32, 87, 131, 163. 
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exception to the implication of the title of his book.
17
 Education through theory, not prescription, is 
the objective. 
 Some authors believe that spacepower theory should be in the business of predicting 
spacepower’s significance, delve into motivations of space-faring states, or altruistically theorise how 
best to secure the benefits of space for ‘the global society.’18 Prediction and in depth-analysis of the 
root motivations of behaviour is not the purview of strategic theory, beyond considering how the 
political characteristics and objectives of the war will influence strategic behaviour and war plans. 
Strategic theory assumes that there are at least two political units ready, willing, or at least preparing 
to use violence to achieve their goals. Beyond that, strategic theory, and therefore spacepower theory, 
has little to offer beyond understanding how and to what end a leadership wishes to make its violent 
political intent manifest under the given constraints. For example, Sadeh argues that: 
‘space developers and users worldwide share a set of basic strategic goals that serve as a 
common and shared basis for space strategy. These goals include: to secure the space domain 
for everyone’s peaceful use; to protect legitimate space assets from the various types of 
threats; and to derive value from space assets for security, economic, civil, and environmental 
ends.’19 
This is followed by a warning that a pitfall to avoid in a space strategy is to fail to ‘understand and 
deter threats and adversaries.’20 One can presume that a space strategy also needs to account for the 
means to ‘address’ such threats if deterrence fails. Although some objectives can be met without the 
use or threat of force, such a view escapes the violent and hostile heart of strategy which takes focus 
away from anything we may understand as ‘war.’21 Strategies and strategic theories are borne of 
violence and the intentional creation of death, suffering, and horror upon others for political 
                                                     
17
 Julian Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover, 2004) 8-14 
18
 Nicolas Peter, ‘The New Space Order: why Space Power Matters for Europe,’ Space & Defense 4:1 (2010) 
58; Harding, Space Policy in Developing, 16- 21 
19
 Eligar Sadeh, ‘Introduction: Towards space strategy,’ in: Eligar Sadeh, ed. Space Strategy in the 21st Century 
(Routledge, 2013) 2 
20
 Ibid., 3 
21
 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans., ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1984) 76  
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objectives. It is dishonest, if not hypocritical, to claim that one is acting for the benefit of ‘all’ in space 
when one is also preparing to deny the use of that medium to others, or use that medium of outer 
space to kill, maim, and cause harm on Earth should the need arise. 
 In sum, spacepower theory is not a space strategy – just as a strategy is not strategic theory. 
Spacepower theory proposes a collection of ideas and propositions to educate the reader and develop 
her intuitive strategic thought regardless of the scenario at hand, whereas a space strategy would be an 
actual plan to deal with specific threats, contingencies, or campaigns that involve or threaten violence 
and destruction. Spacepower theory provides conceptual tools as starting points for analysis for any 
given scenario concerning spacepower, allowing an individual to adapt to the situation at hand based 
on constructive questions raised through the critical application of propositions which retain analytical 
usefulness regardless of the contingency at hand. This is the value and remit of spacepower theory. 
The individual is meant to use the concepts of strategic theory in their own education as a base for 
further analysis and to develop specific space strategies, which closely follows a canon of strategic 
theorists. 
Pedagogy and strategic theory 
Spacepower theory is a framework to build creative thought about a range of possibilities to 
guide decision-making and strategy-making. This spacepower theory not only launches terrestrial 
strategic concepts into orbit, but carries aloft a particular way of thinking with it. The educational and 
indeterminate nature of the theory must be grasped to prevent its misuse, lest a reader believe that the 
propositions of spacepower theory are unassailable maxims for a space strategy. This approach to 
strategic theory is articulated in modern scholarship by Jon Sumida’s pedagogical interpretation of 
Clausewitzian theory, and is at home with the educational intentions of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian 
Corbett, and Raoul Castex as well.
22
  This theory is to guide one in their preparatory strategic 
                                                     
22
 Sumida, Inventing, xv-xviii, 6-7, 44, 67, 69; Jon Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War 
(Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 2008) 5, 100-101, 119-120, 170; Clausewitz, On War, 156-158; Sumida, 
Inventing, xv-xviii, 6-7, 44, 67, 69; Corbett, Principles, 1-9; Raoul Castex, Strategic Theories, trans. and ed. 
Eugenia C. Kiesling (Annapolis, M.D.:Naval Institute Press, 1994) 21-25 
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education, not to accompany them onto the battlefield or the situation room.
23
 Spacepower theory 
aims to encourage a mind to combine discipline (universal concepts) with intuition (solutions to the 
many different manifestations and perceptions of the propositions) so that one can constructively leap 
from the general to the particular, and back again, to sharpen strategic judgment.
24
  
Clausewitz was concerned with attempting to match his universal observations of the nature 
of war with the ever-changing particular characteristics of individual conflicts. He maintained that 
‘war, though conditioned by the particular characteristics of states and their armed forces, must 
contain some more general – indeed, a universal – element which from every theorist ought above all 
to be concerned.’25 He balanced the tension between ‘too great an emphasis on the universal [that] 
leads to the Scylla of banal generalities and dull truths,’ and an ‘emphasis on the particular [which 
leads] to the Charybdis of mindless trivialities and sterile pedantry.’26 To maintain a balance between 
universal truths and particular variations in reality – or historicism – a theory of war must retain a 
balance between those abstract elements of passion, reason, and chance.
27
 Spacepower theory, 
likewise, must retain a balance between its abstract and universal concepts. The command of space 
cannot be dominated by any one aspect, such as space control, denial, or decisive battle. Securing or 
contesting the command of space is the purpose of space warfare and the violent exercise of 
spacepower, but its manifestation in reality will change with the style of warfare of the day, the 
political demands of the belligerents, and the emotional and passionate drives caught up in the 
maelstrom of war. In this way, the idea of the command of space, as explained below, should retain 
conceptual validity in the face of technological change, so long as humans continue to use outer space 
as a medium to communicate, harvest, and deploy resources for strategic effects. 
Spacepower theory, as a type of strategic theory, should help its readers ask, answer, and 
understand questions such as: What form of space warfare and consequences on Earth can be 
expected? So what for the lives of humans on Earth? How would commanding space affect the war as 
                                                     
23
 Clausewitz, On War, 141 
24
 Harold R. Winton, ‘An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Profession’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies 34:6 (2011) 874 
25
 Clausewitz, On War, 593 
26
 Waldman, War, Clausewitz, 42 
27
 Clausewitz, On War, 89 
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a whole? Spacepower theory will not by itself provide answers to these questions – but it can frame 
problems that might assist analysts and strategists in developing their own answers to such questions. 
In Echevarria’s words, Clausewitz’s work ‘is an effort to spare readers the burden of recreating the 
universe of war, so to speak, whenever they needed to learn about war through books. Clausewitz 
performed the taxing and time-consuming labor for them.’28 Spacepower theory aims to quicken, 
sharpen, and critique analyses of particular cases of modern warfare which rely on spacepower or 
exhibit space warfare itself. This theory charts the realm of possibility in history, the present, and the 
future, but it does not prescribe any single course of action. Universal propositions and concepts help 
judge the particular manifestation of warfare against the possibilities of theory by imposing mental 
order on the chaos of reality. This would enable an observer or practitioner to answer the ‘so what?’ 
question to any act of spacepower or space warfare with reference to the command of space and its 
exploitation for an overall war effort. 
Jon Sumida argues that ‘Clausewitz does not believe that any theoretical formulation… can 
prescribe the actual conduct of war. But this does not rule out the use of theoretical propositions to set 
the terms of thinking about a strategic problem… raising questions rather than providing answers.’29 
Reducing the potential sources of error through a poor strategic education is a necessary part of 
modern military education. Existing understandings of warfare and strategy – its political nature, 
paradoxical logic, non-linearity, and uncertainty – apply to space warfare and the employment of 
spacepower in grand strategy.
30
 Any discussion on the grand strategic contributions of spacepower in 
war must begin with the command of space – how to achieve it, what its influence may be, and how 
different activities contribute towards or exploit it. The command of space gets the student started in 
ordering what she knows about space warfare into a strategic context. 
Critical thinking in the intelligent application of propositions are the ideal outcomes of 
spacepower theory. This in turn produces a ‘sensibility’ or a ‘mental character’ that can provide a 
                                                     
28
 Antulio J. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 26 
29
 Sumida, Decoding, 99, 180 
30
 Luttwak argues this throughout his book: Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1987) 
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degree of sound understanding and a platform for further learning, especially in the absence of direct 
or extensive experience.
31
 This attitude is shared by Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett. Self-
education through pondering strategic theory and military history helps hone the individual’s 
command judgment, as Corbett believed that theory was for education and deliberation, but not 
execution.
32
 Mahan’s argument in the seminal Influence of Sea Power, according to Sumida, was that 
the principles on the utility of seapower in geopolitics had instructional value in a liberal arts 
education, and such principles had only an indirect value for the execution of plans.
33
 Critical thought 
in applying the principle of seeking decisive battle is what develops strategic judgment in the 
individual and forms the pedagogical process of seapower theory. Although preferable, both Mahan 
and Corbett argued that destroying enemy forces is a rare opportunity and it should not blind 
commanders to believe the destruction of enemy forces at sea is always worth pursuing at all cost.
34
 
They argued that battle is good to seek if it is feasible, but sometimes it is not feasible and should not 
be pursued. Seeking battle for the command of the sea was an organising proposition to help train 
judgment as to when to seek battle or not. Seeking battle was not an axiom for unquestioned strategic 
success at sea. 
Such a mentality is also exhibited among other strategic theorists. Although there is a risk of 
‘reading us in them’ or the ‘myth of doctrine,’35 the arguments employed by many authors establish a 
persuasive canon of educational strategic theorists.
36
 For strategists, commanders, and scholars, the 
purpose of pure strategic theory, and therefore spacepower theory, is not to develop a worldview that 
predicts every particular eventuality or anomaly in advance. It is, rather, ‘to understand why wrestling 
with these questions can bring better insight into the nature of war,’ which in turn should improve the 
                                                     
31
 Sumida, Decoding, 101 
32
 Ibid., 3 
33
 Sumida, Inventing, xv, xviii, 2-7 
34
 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890) 338-339; Corbett, 
Principles, 99-100, 103-104, 113-118 
35
 George Lawson, ‘The eternal divide? History and International Relations,’ European Journal of International 
Relations 18:2 (2010) 206 
36
 Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Frank Cass, 2001) 3; Miyamoto 
Musashi, The Book of Five Rings, Thomas Cleary trans., ed. (London: Shambala, 2003) 14, 28; Sun Tzu, The 
Art of Warfare, trans. and ed. Roger T. Ames (Ballantine, 1993) in: Caleb Carr, ed., The Book of War (New 
York, N.Y.: Modern Library, 2000) 74 
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quality of analysis and decision-making in the practice of strategy and warfare.
37
 Clausewitz insisted 
that ‘the influence of theoretical truths on practical life is always exerted through critical analysis 
rather than through doctrine… their suitability in any given case must always be a matter of 
judgment.’38 The command of space helps establish theoretical truths about spacepower and space 
warfare, from which minds can critically analyse events and scenarios, but not derive maxims or 
silver bullets from for strategic success. A form of the command of space is what space warfare seeks 
to achieve – but the way it manifests in reality and its overall contributions to a war will vary from 
one case to the next, therefore judgment is needed on applying the concept in practice. That form of 
command can mean an overbearing dominance of outer space, or a momentary clash or diversionary 
ploy to distract or cripple a spacepower at a critical time for operations on Earth. It is hoped that this 
article’s central concept of the command of space triggers constructive and sustained strategic thought 
about outer space, with spacepower theory and the hypothetical thinking it beckons as the means to 
achieve it. 
The command of space 
 The command of space must be exploited for spacepower to have strategic effects on Earth. 
This is true regardless of the type of weapon or method employed. Whether through a nuclear strike, a 
space blockade, or a comprehensive jamming effort, they must all be made in reference to controlling 
or denying the command of space for supporting the ultimate purposes of the conflict at hand. The 
command of space connects specific acts of or engagements in space warfare from the tactical and 
operational levels towards a higher plane of strategy and grand strategy; linking tactical space activity 
to the war’s ultimate political object. Space warfare is the continuation of Terran politics by other 
means, and the command of space connects space warfare to those wider political goals.
39
 The 
command of space is an overarching concept of spacepower theory because the sub-concepts of space 
control and space denial are intimately related and frequently overlap in terms of their effects. Despite 
                                                     
37
 Handel, Masters, 7 
38
 Clausewitz, On War, 156, 158 
39
 Paraphrasing Clausewitz, On War, p. 87 
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their different emphases and connotations, both control and denial are sought in order to secure or 
contest the command of space and prepare for its exploitation on Earth.  
The command of space encourages a space-centric mode of thought in without undermining 
the necessity of ‘joint’ military thought. Space specialists must be able to communicate their unique 
capabilities and needs to the wider civilian and military capabilities, interests, and structures of a 
modern military power. The command of space is fundamental because it is the conceptual connection 
between a top-level grand strategy and the particular space strategies, operations, and tactics of space 
warfare in a war. Who controls or is denied the medium of space for strategic effect on Earth is what 
drives space warfare and gives it strategic meaning and political purpose. Whether a high-altitude 
nuclear strike from North Korea disables American and Allied spacepower, or the United States 
isolating Iraq from space communications in a space blockade, such actions can be conceptually 
connected in how they are undertaken to dispute the command of space or exploit the effects of such 
command on Earth. Without a clear understanding of what space warfare may contribute towards, 
discussions regarding the strategic implications of space weapons (including Earth and space-based 
kinds) will remain in a political vacuum, devoid of meaning and insight for war plans that are focused 
on achieving political objectives on Earth. However fought, space warfare is waged to influence the 
command of space. 
Who commands space, and how a particular factor influences that command must have a 
tangible effect for grand strategy and wider objectives on Earth. Paul Kennedy defines a grand 
strategy as the bringing together of all the ‘elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the 
preservation and enhancement of the nation’s (wartime and peacetime long term) interests.’40 
Spacepower is embedded within this larger context – and the command of space, whether it is 
primarily held more in terms of controlling a vast space infrastructure or denying the use of the 
enemy’s own must contribute to the wider war and long-term grand strategies of the actors involved 
                                                     
40
 Paul Kennedy, ‘Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition’, in: Paul Kennedy, ed., 
Grand Strategies in War and Peace (London: Yale University Press, 1991) 5 
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in spacepower. Spacepower must take grand strategy into account, and grand strategy in the Space 
Age must take the command of space and its exploitation into account. 
 Therefore, the command of space forms a two-way connection between spacepower and 
grand strategy, much in the same way that the command of the sea makes the student or practitioner 
think of the role of seapower in a wider war based on the control, denial, and exploitation of the sea. 
A power’s grand strategy, existing capabilities, geographic, and technological features will condition 
how their command of space manifests and how they may engage in a space warfare campaign. At the 
same time, they must also accept the physical realities inherent in struggling over the command of a 
medium such as outer space, and must be able to orchestrate varying capabilities in controlling or 
denying that medium, or both, depending on the circumstances of the case at hand. Regardless of the 
actor, the command of space, with the sub-concepts of control and denial, are universally relevant in 
space warfare. To have any strategic meaning any action must help control or deny that medium, to 
contribute to the overall command of space, which then allows for the exploitation of that medium for 
the war on Earth. Such is the foundational theoretical truth espoused by spacepower theory, as derived 
from seapower theory. This point may seem obvious or banal, but this concept is the foundation from 
which further strategic concepts for spacepower theory are developed from, both below in this article 
and in a forthcoming monograph. 
In greater detail, the command of space means that the strategic object of space warfare is 
always to secure and/or deny the use of celestial lines of communication where objects and 
information travel in, from, towards, and through space.
41
 The command of space can be influenced 
by either seeking to achieve space control or engage in space denial (also known as ‘counterspace’) 
operations, or both. In practice, control and denial are not mutually exclusive; doing one usually 
involves executing some degree of the other, much like Clausewitz’s thinking on the intimacy of the 
connections between the defence and the offensive.
42
 Commanding space is not the same as 
controlling or denying space infrastructure. Being in command of relevant parts of space is not 
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synonymous with controlling relevant space infrastructure; indeed, denying the use of certain orbits 
means only that one is commanding the use or non-use of certain orbits. This means that a power 
without an elaborate space infrastructure, but with rudimentary Earth-based antisatellite weapons, can 
contest the command of space through a space denial campaign. This means that an influence can be 
exerted on outer space without a large presence in that medium. A North Korean scorched orbit 
strategy employing high-altitude nuclear detonations may be an example. However, commanding 
relevant areas of space for a comprehensive spacepower would translate into more space control 
options as a matter of course. 
Space control is conceived as a sub-concept of the command of space so that the theory is 
also distanced from the concept of space control as used in the narrow confines of the American 
doctrinal and policy-advocacy space weaponisation debates, where one school is termed as ‘space 
control.’43 Space control in this spacepower theory is one form of visualising the command of space 
with a mind to possessing and exploiting an elaborate space infrastructure (satellite constellations, 
extensive terrestrial down- and up-link communications hubs, launch complexes, etc.). Controlling 
space tends to denote an ability to use one’s own most essential celestial lines of communication 
without major disruption. Visions of space control tend to gravitate towards a large, perhaps 
dominating space power that harnesses spacepower for terrestrial warfare and economics on Earth.
44
 
When it controls space, it can make its spacepower felt in terrestrial conflict with ease and confidence 
in the most vital occasions. Spacepowers such and the United States and China (especially as time 
progresses) are examples of states that would seek to ensure space control through their command of 
space for their modernised forces.
45
 This has some comfortable parallels to aspects of seapower 
theory, which are explored below. 
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Space denial, meanwhile, tends to connote a weaker space power attempting to deny that 
elaborate space infrastructure to a dominant space power. Denying (or attempting to deny) the use of 
celestial lines of communication is still attempting to command space. A power being able to deny 
celestial lines of communication still possesses a command of space. A successful denial operation – 
like crippling a few select satellites – may enable successful military operations on Earth whilst an 
opposing spacepower’s usual support networks are impaired. These are crude depictions of denial and 
control, but they are useful to highlight the core difference between the terms – denial tends to prevent 
an enemy exploitation of an elaborate space infrastructure, whilst control intends to enable the 
exploitation of space infrastructure. Whether a belligerent’s space strategy in a particular war rests 
upon ensuring space control or space denial, they are both concerned with influencing the command 
of space in their favour, and must exploit it for strategic effect on Earth. In practice, however, large 
powers may engage in space denial. 
The command of space offers a term that helps bridge the complementary dualities of space 
control and space denial, highlights their common purpose, and determines their effect on the wider 
war. Any act of space warfare – framed as part of control or denial operations – must significantly 
impact the command of space to have any chance of being strategically meaningful. Control and 
denial signify different activities, yet they often impact on each other and no strictly exclusive 
categorisation should be made in practice, particularly as control and denial can be employed by both 
large and small spacepower to varying degrees. Whether an action fits more into a denial or control 
framing could depend on its context and particular effects, rather than on the means used. This is 
especially important given the use of ‘control,’ denial,’ ‘offensive,’ and ‘defensive counterspace’ 
terms in space doctrine language.
46
 This corresponds to Clausewitz’s practical approach to terms that 
drive at the heart of concepts, but are blurred at their edges.
47
  Such is the case with space control and 
denial, which have distinct cores but blurred boundaries. The symbolic ambiguity of weapons 
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systems,
48
 and consequently military action, makes any declaration of a military action as a defensive 
campaign or an offensive manoeuvre a highly charged political act and does not provide more 
objective and strategically accurate terms. 
For example, a U.S. space control campaign could be aggressively pursued by denying 
Chinese access to and the use of outer space, whilst the war on Earth may be on the strategic 
defensive for the United States and its allies following a Chinese offensive in the South China Sea and 
the Taiwan Strait. Such a campaign would see both China and the United States engage in space 
control and space denial operations in various forms and degrees, as both have spacepower-integrated 
terrestrial forces. Both would be contesting each other’s command of space, but if China succeeds in 
only denying the use of space to the United States yet fails in its own space control campaign it would 
be an entirely different to scenario to succeeding at both. A working Chinese command of space 
would be heavily characterised by its space denial against the United States, but it would not have any 
more control over its own space systems. But that is yet only a form of a Chinese command of space, 
achieved by Earth-based space denial weapons. 
Another possibility is that a Chinese space denial campaign may assist its space control 
operations, and vice versa. Whether U.S. space control efforts were significantly dented may even 
determine the conflict to a greater extent than American space denial efforts against Chinese 
spacepower, owing to China’s still-developing dependence on spacepower for terrestrial operations. 
Without either side contesting the command of space – without an incidence of space warfare – both 
sides would enjoy a degree of space control over their own space infrastructure to allow unfettered 
space-enabled precision warfare and networked forces. At the heart of this is the notion of space 
control as securing and taking advantage of space infrastructure, whilst denial is about preventing the 
use of such infrastructure. Both control and denial are equally valid sub-components of commanding 
and exploiting space, and does not have any absolutist quality or retain relevance only for large 
spacepowers. This vision of commanding a medium has precedents in seapower theory. 
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The wrath of Mahan: Precedents from seapower theory 
The general notion of commanding the medium has obvious parallels to the sea, and the 
somewhat intuitive analogy from the sea to space is not new. What is new in this article, however, is 
that it lies to rest some of the inaccurate distinctions made between Corbett’s and Mahan’s thinking 
on the command of the sea and the role of seeking battle. The spacepower theory literature is troubled 
by problematic readings of source analogies – in this case seapower theory – which this section 
attempts to rectify by producing coherent ideas about spacepower theory based on a unified approach 
from Mahan and Corbett. Their unity makes it easier to develop the permeability of the command of 
space, the contingent decisiveness of such command, and the roles of support from orbit and 
(in)decisive battle against space systems.  
Many spacepower theorists have analogised from the sea to space. Colin Gray claims that 
‘controlling space is the idea that most usefully directs attention to the emerging status of the space 
environment as a (global) combat “theatre.”’49 Furthermore, he also argues that the basic idea of 
commanding the sea as analogous to commanding space ‘accommodates the minor qualifications… 
that our space/sea forces will suffer some harassment and losses in space/at sea, and that the enemy 
will be able to secure erratic and minor-scale access to some orbits/put to sea in a small way.’50 
Martin E.B. France made some observations on Mahan’s conditions of sea power as having parallels 
with spacepower, but is essentially a taxonomy that does not explicitly promote strategic thought.
51
 
Everett Dolman’s Astropolitik advocates dominating the medium through geopolitically-derived 
chokepoints in accessing orbit and various transfer routes and lanes of commerce into other regions of 
the cosmos.
52
 John Klein’s work made an important contribution by analogising Corbett’s core 
seapower theory.
53
 The notion of commanding the sea translates well enough into orbit, so much so 
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that merely changing key naval terms to refer to outer space does the concept justice in Corbett’s own 
words: 
‘By winning [the] command of [space] we… [place] ourselves in position to exert direct 
military pressure on the national life of our enemy [on Earth], whilst at the same time we 
solidify [a barrier] against him and prevent his exerting direct military pressure on 
ourselves… [The] command of [space], therefore, means nothing but the control of [celestial] 
communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of [space] warfare 
is the control of communications, and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of territory.’54  
What has been missing in previous seapower analogies to outer space is an acknowledgement of the 
apparent unity that the seapower theorists display over their understanding of the command of the sea. 
Mahan, like Corbett, noted the permeable and variable nature of the command of the sea; it is not 
absolute even after a decisive engagement.
55
 Through the creation of spacepower theory, an insight 
into the subtleties and commonalities between Mahan and Corbett which is lacking in existing works 
may be gained. 
The value of the apparent conceptual agreements between Mahan and Corbett is shown in 
four truths that develop the command of space. The first is that the idea of the command of the sea has 
been mistakenly taken to mean an ability to command all of the sea at all times, rather than controlling 
or denying select areas for specific timespans.
56
 This means that the command of space is a concept 
that is useful for small and large space powers to judge their space warfare efforts against because 
spacepower theory charts possibilities and alternatives. Spacepower theory makes no positive claims 
as to how easy or difficult it is to secure varying levels of command in any given case. Any condition 
of the command of space has to take into account any relevant party’s ability to control and deny 
outer space. Commanding space is not synonymous with dominating it, as is sometimes inferred 
through the notion of command of the sea.
57
 The permeable and relative nature of the command of sea 
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is also transferred to outer space, meaning that a ‘good enough’ degree of command is the objective, 
rather than absolute dominance. What matters in practice is a good enough command, or ‘reasonably 
secure communication,’ as Mahan put it.58 The command of the sea is therefore not an archaic concept 
relevant only to large powers. This aspect is a relatively simple point, but it is crucial to comprehend 
the complexity and variability of the command of space.  
A second theoretical truth drawn out from Mahan’s and Corbett’s seapower theories is that 
commanding space – whether through denial, control, or both – is not inherently decisive. It may or 
may not be, depending on the situation. Spacepower or space infrastructure is not always amenable to 
being described as a centre of gravity and determining of future wars on Earth, contrary to what some 
spacepower theorists have envisioned.
59
 A centre of gravity can be anything that represents ‘the hub 
of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our 
energies should be directed.’60 A space strategy for the United States today may have many 
reasonable grounds for describing its spacepower as a centre of gravity, which would make securing 
the command of space through a space control-orientated space strategy an understandable 
preoccupation. The US military would undoubtedly be severely disrupted, if not debilitated, should its 
military communications and navigation satellites be denied. But a spacepower theory – which must 
be relevant to all scenarios involving spacepower at any time in any circumstance – cannot claim that 
space is as important to every entity in every situation, especially as major space powers continue to 
fight low-technology and non-state adversaries. This demonstrates the importance of distinguishing 
the particular from the universal; the space strategy from the spacepower theory. This is not to 
diminish the importance of spacepower for the major actors of today – but it is to caution against the 
unthinking application of the centre of gravity to develop a silver bullet for future wars. 
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A third truth based on seapower theory is that spacepower is a source of support for the 
primary theatre of a conflict and infrastructure on Earth, and commanding space to exploit or deny 
this supporting capability is the ultima ratio of space warfare. That support, or its denial, must have 
consequences on Earth for the resources paid into them to pay dividends in war. Corbett famously 
declared that:  
‘Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have 
always been decided – except in the rarest of cases – either by what your army can do against 
your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible 
for your army to do.’61 
Again, the desire to not ascribe any declaration an axiomatic quality is evident by still allowing for a 
rare case in which a conflict may be decided at sea. Spacepower and commanding space is most 
important in what it allows you to do on Earth, to borrow Corbett’s language above. In the same vein, 
Mahan theorised that: 
‘the service between the bases and the mobile force between the ports and fleets is mutual. In 
this respect the navy is essentially a light corps; it keeps open the communications between its 
own ports, it obstructs those of the enemy; but it sweeps the sea for the service of the land, it 
controls the desert that man may live and thrive on the habitable globe.’62 
This view of seapower’s supporting functions translates extremely well to contemporary spacepower 
and how modern force-enhancement, economic development, and environmental monitoring on our 
habitable globe are provided by spacepower.  
Mahan did not take the command of the sea to be decisive by itself – it needs to be 
consciously exploited for strategic effect. Mahan examined the failure of the French navy to exploit 
their decisive victory against the English at Beachy Head in the Nine Years’ War (1688-1697) by not 
acting to cut off English communications to Ireland. The same theoretical truth is valid for 
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spacepower. Whichever military service – or even civilian agency – provides spacepower for a 
political entity essentially subordinates its activity to the needs of people, entities, and political 
ambitions on Earth. It is important for spacepower theory to consider the non-battle and supporting 
aspects of spacepower, much as Corbett and Mahan did with seapower. There is a large body of 
literature on space weaponisation that unduly draws attention to embryonic or non-existent space-
based weapons at the expense of examining the ramifications of Earth-based weapons systems and the 
support and force enhancement functions that defines contemporary spacepower.
63
 Exacting critiques 
of this literature have been written elsewhere and will not be repeated here.
64
 The benefits accrued 
from space systems – such as precision bombing and precision agriculture, the digital banking system, 
and continent-wide instantaneous wireless communications – affect death and taxes on Earth in a 
much more profound way than does an obsession with embryonic or latent space-based weaponry.  
This does not mean that the army should dictate everything a navy does, or that terrestrial 
forces must rigidly control ‘space forces.’ But in strategic terms, a supporting medium must 
ultimately contribute objectives to where humans live and a grand strategy’s objective. Placing 
weapons in outer space, for example, may be a waste of resources for the United States if the enemy 
can adapt to a loss of space infrastructure, target space-based weapons and valuable unarmed satellites 
with ground-based weapons systems, or retaliate with escalatory measures such as nuclear weapons. 
Understanding what these scenarios mean in strategic terms relies on space specialists being able to 
make spacepower and space warfare relevant and integrated into terrestrially-focused states and 
political interests, and not treating events in space security in a vacuum separated from concerns on 
Earth. The command of space not only helps visualise the kinds of competition that may occur in 
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space warfare, but also insists on large-scale and multi-environment strategic thinking. This 
spacepower theory encourages thought on the influence of spacepower upon Earth as well as the 
strategic dynamics of space warfare. This is a reflection of Corbett and Mahan’s interests in the 
influence of seapower on the land. Judgment is required to decide when which course of action and 
organisation is needed, as instructed by the classical theorists. Sometimes, battle or destruction 
between Earth-based weapons and satellites may be necessary. Unfortunately, ceaseless debate on 
space weapons alone draws attention away from the actual use of spacepower in warfare and security 
policies. A complementary approach to spacepower theory based on stressing the commonalities in 
both the educational intent and content of Mahanian and Corbettian seapower theory not only 
promotes a reasoned grasp of space warfare, the supporting role of spacepower, and its inherently 
contingent influence on Earth, but also encourages a particular way of critical thought and strategic 
intuition. 
The fourth and final value of engaging with the unified seapower theorists is that it 
accommodates the role of battle in a wider understanding of the inherently undetermined decisiveness 
of commanding a medium. Mahan did not argue that seeking battle was always the correct decision. 
Corbett used Mahan’s own arguments to criticise the US Navy’s foolhardy decision to axiomatically 
pursue a decisive battle against the Spanish in the American-Spanish War, which neglected the more 
strategically-decisive and vulnerable US amphibious operations on Cuba.
65
 Space warfare may entail 
Earth-to-space, space-to-space, and space-to-Earth operations that can involve physical destruction 
and electromagnetic disruption. The first two are feasible today with various methods. Decisive 
engagement with space systems in orbit or against terrestrial space infrastructure (such as control 
stations and spaceports) could lead to a more efficient command of space. Whether or not battle 
involves Earth-based antisatellite weapons or terrestrial strikes on ground-based space infrastructure, 
the role of engagements in spacepower will suffer the same theoretical truths as in seapower theory. 
The given tool of space warfare does not change the decisiveness of space warfare, nor of 
commanding space.  This does not change whether Earth-based or space-based weapons are 
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employed. Decisive battle would be the ideal method in theory for securing a command of space 
against a space power – but it may be difficult to bring about, and its result may well be strategically 
indecisive. This aspect of the theory is not encountered in John Klein’s interpretation of Mahan’s 
work. Klein writes that ‘Mahan’s strategic theory insists that the “proper sphere” of the fleet is 
offensive operations. Additionally, little attention is given to matters that are outside the direct action 
of navies and fleets.’66 John Sheldon, too, criticises Mahan for fixating upon decisive battle. He 
argued that ‘Corbett instead asserted that sea control… was the object because such control was local 
and temporary, then decisive battle for it was not always, if rarely necessary.’67 This is a false 
dichotomy between Mahan and Corbett. These interpretations are in stark contrast to Mahan’s 
understanding of the ‘incorrectness’ of the maxim of decisive battle in the Spanish-American war.  
Such criticisms do not take into account Mahan’s wider interests in the economic, 
bureaucratic, and cultural aspects of sea power, and his recognition of wars where ‘navies were of 
great direct military value, though they fought no battles.’68 This is highly analogous to outer space 
today, where space-to-space combat is not a predominant concern. Earth-based anti-satellite weapons 
systems are only now maturing, if still lacking in quantity, and space-based weapons are an exotic and 
embryonic technology and should not disproportionately dominate strategic thinking about outer 
space. Space warfare does not need space-based weapons to be used, as Earth-based systems (such as 
so-called ballistic missile defences) can already intercept unarmed satellites providing services to 
Terran militaries and economies and low and medium Earth orbits. Destroying specific satellites is no 
guarantee of securing the command of space, if precedents set by seapower theory are borne out in 
orbit. If decisive battle in orbit is a risk, then the weaker side would naturally seek to undermine 
efforts to allow that decisive battle to happen, or enact alternatives to mitigate the strategic effects of 
such a battle. Corbett argued that ‘the most thorny questions [British commanders] had to decide… 
was not how to defeat the enemy, but how to bring him to action.’69 This action and reaction cycle 
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would continuously change the odds and feasibility of encountering a battle, and that strategic logic 
applies to the cat-and-mouse relationship between satellites and counterspace weapons. 
Reflecting on the Spanish-American War and the Russo-Japanese war, Corbett commented 
that ‘what the maxim [of seeking decisive battle] really means is that we should endeavour from the 
first to secure contact in the best position for bringing about a complete decision in our favour, and as 
soon as the other parts of our war plan… will permit.’70 Corbett went on, however, to claim that if the 
primary theatre of operations is on land, then efforts to secure a decisive battle must be tempered by 
the needs of the land war.
71
 This has clear parallels to spacepower as we know it today. With 
spacepower being integrated into terrestrial support operations in more militaries across Earth, major 
spacepowers will be caught between the dual horns of spending resources on struggling for the 
command of space, or spending resources to exploit such command for strategic effects on Earth. 
Though the latter cannot be done without the former, the latter’s absence makes the former 
strategically pointless. This should temper any desire exhibited by some spacepower theorists to 
dominate outer space for its own sake, or seeking decisive battle in space above all else, rather than 
attacking enemy support systems in space or exploiting one’s own in joint warfare.72 
The core ideas of the command of the sea – its permeability and the indeterminate and 
contingent role of decisive battle and commanding the sea itself – have utility for thinking about 
spacepower and space warfare through the critical analysis and application of its theoretical truths. 
The vista of seapower theory is spacepower’s potential. Belligerents may have varying degrees of 
control and varying successes in denial in certain orbits and certain times with certain space systems. 
Tying space warfare into how it affects the command of space is the value of using Mahanian and 
Corbettian foundations from the command of the sea. A successful space warfare campaign may 
secure a control of space and allow a general command of space, but it by no means makes the enemy 
a powerless actor nor does it guarantee success on Earth. Judgment would be required to understand 
when a space warfare campaign may yet translate into tangible and significant benefits on Earth. 
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Expectations from the propositions of spacepower theory must be managed carefully by grasping the 
indecisiveness cautioned by seapower theory. 
Conclusion 
This article has made several arguments that highlight the theoretical truths of spacepower 
theory. Space warfare is waged for the command of space, which is about controlling or denying the 
use of space for oneself and the enemy. This foundational theoretical truth connects all activities of 
space warfare into a higher strategic level of comprehension. Destroying a satellite, for example, must 
meaningfully contribute to a command of space in either material or psychological ways or it is a 
waste of resources. Commanding space must then translate into effects on Earth to have an effect on 
grand strategy. If outer space is to be contested in future, every space power will be interested in 
commanding space to a good enough degree for its ends, whether through denying space 
infrastructure to others or controlling it for oneself. The command of space can manifest in 
unpredictable and diverse ways owing to the situation at hand. This has clear parallels to seapower 
theory, in both Mahan’s and Corbett’s works. The nature of such command is permeable and not 
absolute, as derived from seapower theory. The command of space does not assume an all-or nothing 
scenario; different sectors and altitudes of Earth orbit may be more or less contested by the enemy, 
and more or less useful in various conflicts. Space warfare does not herald certain death from above, 
nor does it provide a strategic panacea for terrestrial problems. The command of space must be 
consciously exploited for strategic effect on Earth according to the situation at hand. 
The unity of thinking about seapower among Corbett and Mahan forms a stable conceptual 
core which focuses thinking of spacepower on commanding that medium and its communications. 
Mahanian and Corbettian seapower theories should be understood as complementary, not 
dichotomous, in both their educational intent and conceptual content, particularly in how they stress 
that the command of a medium is not inherently decisive by itself. The command of space is only 
relevant in how it allows spacepower to influence a wider war on Earth, and its strategic significance 
is not set in stone. Destroying or disrupting space infrastructure is not an end in itself; the command of 
space stresses the subordination of such means towards strategic ends on Earth. Similarly, seeking 
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battle in space should never be an end in itself. Seapower theory proposes that space battle will not 
necessarily be any more or less decisive than naval clashes in the context of seapower and grand 
strategy. Rather than portraying space infrastructure as a centre of gravity, judgment is needed from 
the individual to identify it, if one exists, and strike. Space may be a centre of gravity for some 
political actors, but not all, and some may prepare alternatives and redundancies.  
Lastly, the key to grasping the value of seapower theory and spacepower theory is in their 
pedagogical roles in promoting flexibility in interpreting and applying theoretical truths. Yagyu 
Munenori put it in stark terms: 
‘It is sickness to be obsessed with winning, it is sickness to be obsessed with using martial 
arts, and it is sickness to be obsessed with putting forth all one has learned. It is sickness to be 
obsessed with offense, and it is also sickness to be obsessed with defense.’73 
In order to properly use spacepower theory, and any strategic theory, Munenori’s words must be 
heeded. Strategic theory helps chart possibilities but does not determine action. The command of 
space is important as the first proposition of spacepower theory because it forces the mind to sketch a 
‘big picture’ for those wishing to learn to think strategically about the methods of space warfare, the 
development of outer space, and its consequences for modern warfare in the Space Age. Without 
commanding space for strategic effects, spacepower ceases to be strategically relevant. Flexible, 
critical, and intuitive strategic thought and analysis are needed to make the correct decisions in 
practical reality, for which there is no positive guide for action. But the command of space offers a 
starting template for systemic strategic thought. Without understanding the pedagogy and 
epistemology of such theory, there will always be a chance that a reader will attempt to divine axioms 
for success from such military philosophy.  
Space is politically and militarily a rather familiar frontier; space warfare is merely the 
continuation of Terran politics by other means. The command of space merely marks the conceptual 
launch point for systemic strategic thought about outer space. It is hoped that this article broadens the 
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view of spacepower beyond the narrow confines of the (U.S.) space weaponisation debate. It is also 
hoped that it will encourage critical consideration of the influence of spacepower upon the present in a 
way that is not determined by technological and mechanistic thinking alone, echoing Mahan’s own 
educational intent with a liberal arts education for Navy officers.
74
 In this sense, the Mahan for the 
final frontier may well be Alfred Thayer Mahan himself.  
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